Hyde
Jul 11 2007, 09:26 PM
With everything wireless, it has become easier for hackers to ruin your plot by hacking everything from outside (proviidng they have good skills and programs) then getting any info available. It's hard to have a site completely cut from the matrix, as they need at least one connection to a security service for instance, and the hacker can hack everything from this point.
While it has its good points (like data searching without the trouble of finding a jackpoint, discussion with team members, ...), the drawback is hard !
Has the need of the hacker to physically go to the node's place disappeared?
How do you deal with that in your games?
Buster
Jul 11 2007, 09:30 PM
Three words: Wireless blocking paint.
coolgrafix
Jul 11 2007, 09:36 PM
Not sure I'm following you. There were isolated systems off the Matrix proper in previous editiions and they still exist in 2070. Can't avoid having to go to the facility.
Sort of sounds like you're saying that just because a company's building has a Matrix connection to their off-site security monitoring firm that the hacker can exploit this connection to get carte blanche, and that's just not necessarily the case. No reason for the monitoring service to in any way share the same internal filespace as the rest of a company's network.
James McMurray
Jul 11 2007, 09:37 PM
Truly secure data should not be connected to the same servers the wage slaves use to surf the web between cracks of the whip. Anything worthy of a well-paying run is likely to be land-line only, requiring the decker get inside the building, or a secure subsection of the building, in order to do his thing.
Also, if it's possible to "ruin your plot" I think you're looking at the GM's job from the wrong angle, but that's entirely opinion and something that's probably too big for this thread to contain.
Buster
Jul 11 2007, 09:38 PM
Check out knassers totally awesome matrix site. He explains it all very well and has tons of GMing ideas:
http://forums.dumpshock.com/index.php?showtopic=17976
knasser
Jul 11 2007, 10:18 PM
Thank you for that. Happiness + 1.
I worry that some GMs use wireless blocking paint habitually, always with the default assumption that it is their job to ensure that the 4th edition rules never affect the way things used to work.
But then I have similar feelings about the frequent use of background count to hamstring mages.
There are several reasons why a hacker would go onsite.
First and foremost, is probably that the hacker is part of the team and the team might need her with them. They are
not going to be happy when they stumble at a maglock and their hacker is at home. Or a security camera or heavily armed drone, automatic tripod gun, a security guard they need to stop using his commlink to raise the alert, ad infinitem. A good hacker does far more than Matrix bimbling. And as a consequence, you'll want her with you.
Secondly, working your way through the outside of a system to get to the good bits can take time. A lot of time. In fact, unless the hacker wants to hack on the fly, also known as the "Guys, I'm taking a 1 in 3 chance of blowing the run before we even start" approach, then it's going to take hours to get in. At least. There are numerous occasions when you don't have hours to spare. You need in right now, and physically penetrating the compound is often one way of jumping past the security.
Thirdly, it might actually be safer. Try as he might, it's more than possible for an enemy hacker or IC to track the hacker's physical location. Especially the hacker. You don't want to be in a VR coma with all your tough friends busy storming a corp HQ twenty miles away when Lonestar bust down your door. And that's leaving aside that they now know where your safe house is, too.
Fourthly, if something goes wrong, the hacker who is with the team can still provide a useful function. He can shut down cameras directly and hack terminals right in front of him. The remote hacker can theoretically do just as much but if he blows his cover early on, that player is going to end up sitting around waiting to find out if his friends come home or not. It can be a bit all or nothing when your remote, but the hacker onsite still has options.
Fifth, there is communication. If the team has to go silent, or the opposition are onto them and start severing outside connections, the hacker might find herself in the unpleasant position of not knowing what her teamates are doing or where they are. Of course it's worse for the team onsite who just want one little door opened before they all get torn apart by hell hounds.
Finally, and I know it's a cliche, there are some things that aren't connected to the rest of the system. I use this very sparingly but you can say that Lab X isn't connected to the main systems and someone is going to have to go in there in person.
And all that said, you often find that the hacker is not a pure hacker, but is a samurai hacker. Very often, they
want to go in and shoot people.
However, having made a big solid case for why the hacker has to go in, it can be quite fun to have the hacker running oversight from home. After all, there are still risks for the hacker. And I find that hacker archetypes often appeal to the cerebal strategist type of player, so the position of Lieutenant Goreman in Aliens, that is to say co-ordinating the assault with the plans and the hacked security camera feeds the blinking icons, can be plenty of fun too.
-K.
Eleazar
Jul 11 2007, 10:22 PM
Every corporate facility is going to have something to the effect of VPN in Shadowrun. Corporations are always looking for more ways to get the most out of the wageslaves and one of the best is to even have them work when they aren't at work. I don't see any big corporation not having some way for a wageslave to connect from home to be able to get work done. This would mean having whatever access they needed to get the job done, which is going to be your whole network. I don't see things changing, even Microsoft, one of the most security conscious corporations out there today, has VPN access to their network. It is just something that is very necessary today in corporations to ensure optimum work productivity. I don't see that changing in 2070 in our future, and I don't see that being any different in the very corporation focused world of Shadowrun.
Even the US government uses VPNs. The only places I can see having their network completely closed off, in Shadowrun, are places where all employees live on-site. Even then, such places will be connected to the main corporate or government network. Otherwise, it becomes way too difficult to manage that network and ensure strict security policy on that network. Not only that, but I think the management at the main corporate headquarters would want to be able to get data from offsite without having to travel to every offsite facility.
Even if you block something with wireless paint, there is going to be a link somewhere that will let a hacker in. I have already listed an exception to this rule, feel free to add any you can think of. The hacker bar in Knasser's PDF is a good example of another exception.
One other thing to realize, if a network is completely closed off from the outside world, that means it is also completely closed off TO the outside world. Anyone on that network won't be able to make a phone call to any of their clients or partners; unless there is another network running right along side it that is, you guessed it, open.
James McMurray
Jul 11 2007, 10:33 PM
QUOTE (Eleazar) |
One other thing to realize, if a network is completely closed off from the outside world, that means it is also completely closed off TO the outside world. Anyone on that network won't be able to make a phone call to any of their clients or partners, unless there is another network running right along side it that is, you guessed it, open. |
In modern security, at least in the two government contractor companies I've worked for so far, computer labs that are higher than Classified work exactly like that. All of the work is done on computers that are behind closed and locked doors. If the people in the lab are lucky enough to have an outside computer connection they share a single computer that everyone takes turns on checking email, surfing the web, and updating their calendar. The room may have an outside network, but it's completely worthless to anyone trying to hack their way in from the outside.
The non-government-contract R&D work we do follows similar guidelines, but I've never worked on one of those projects so can't give full details.
Ravor
Jul 12 2007, 03:51 AM
Plus you have to remember that unlike the real world, encryption in the Sixth World is a joke, so unless the corps are run by morons, Matrix Security isn't going to relay on anything that requires decent encryption to actually work, so yes, Wi-Fi Blocking Paint, hardwired connections, and offline networks are going to be a big part in any corp security plan.
tweak
Jul 12 2007, 06:18 AM
I would think that wireless setups would mostly handle trivial applications. Data that needs to be restricted to a particular area would be offline -- not connected to the matrix at all. It could be on the keyring of an exec -- think of the future of usb thumb drives . It's better to disconnect the computer from the matrix then spend a fortune trying to come up with software based security.
If you want to read a modern take on corporate security, check out Corporate Espionage. It's a really good book and covers physical security and managing software security.
So let's say your runners are hired to obtain data. There are a few approaches:
1) break-in and steal it (probably more fun to play)
2) find someone inside to steal it for you
3) get a job inside and steal it
And your team will have to weight the risks with each approach.
tweak
knasser
Jul 12 2007, 07:26 AM
QUOTE (Ravor @ Jul 12 2007, 03:51 AM) |
Plus you have to remember that unlike the real world, encryption in the Sixth World is a joke, so unless the corps are run by morons, Matrix Security isn't going to relay on anything that requires decent encryption to actually work, so yes, Wi-Fi Blocking Paint, hardwired connections, and offline networks are going to be a big part in any corp security plan. |
BY SR4 rules, a remote system can be just as secure as an on-site system.
Wageslaves 1-20 all work from home. They sit at their terminals in their studies, which together with a computer onsite, comprise a Corp Node A. Let's give it the following:
Node A (System 3, Firewall 5, Response 3, Analyze 3, Encrypt 3)
This node can function as the actual work environment, but to be a little more security concious, we will have a node that actually is onsite only, but which the external node connects to.
Node B (System 4, Firewall 4, Response 4, Analyze 4)
So the home wage-slave connects to Node A through their terminal at home, and then proceeds from there to go to Node B and get on with their work.
What are the ways that this set-up can be attacked by a hacker? Well getting to Node B where the juicy data is means going through Node A so in principle and practice, it isn't any easier than going to a site's normal external node and hacking your way through it to get inside. The only difference would not be between normal onsite systems and the offsite approach, but between both of these and an onsite approach that had no external connection to the Matrix at all. And for a long list of reasons, that approach is not compatible with normal day to day working. Remember that Saeder-Krupp's Secret Research Lab is not the standard. The standard is your average company and they will use this set-up routinely. The advantages are enormous.
Just to clarify how hacking the remote system would work, I'll give examples.
If the wageslaves connect to their terminals through a wireless link then a hacker could sneak into their house or squat below their window and attempt access (their home terminal will obviously only require a very low signal). If their connection to the terminal is wired, which is an easy choice), then the hacker is reduced to physically breaking in to access the terminal itself or somehow interfering with the signal at the data exchanges that route the signal to the office.
I would say for reasons of game balance and setting consistency that logging into a local Matrix exchange and tapping the swarm of signals being routed through it is a difficult task. Not impossible as it's been done in previous editions, but I would say that the weak point that will be attacked will be the worker's own home. So let us assume that the hacker squats outside the window (if wireless) or is forced to make a wired connection to the employee's terminal. What can they then do? Well if the system is wireless then they can tap the signal as follows:
Electronic Warfare + Scan (4) to locate the hidden node, followed by Response + Decrypt (6, 1 turn) to break the encryption (unless IC is used) followed by Electronic Warfare + Sniffer (3) test.
Note that IC could be used to strengthen the encryption in the above.
In any case, if they succeed on this then they will get to view the data that is going back and forth between the wageslave and his node. This will be a lot of virtual reality input, the equivalent of looking over someone's shoulder when they use a monitor. You might find useful information, but your certainly not able to root around in the system looking for it and that accounts spreadsheet that you're looking at is not a file you can snag. It's just a picture of the parts that the employee looks at. Very frustrating I would think and not nearly as effective as hacking the node.
Which brings us on to the second approach which is to hack the node properly. If it is wireless, then you can get close as above and make normal hacking rolls. If it is wired, then you have to physically connect somehow. But in either case, you are back to traditional hacking of the site that is no easier than locating the office itself and tyring to hack your way through whatever external facing node connects to the Matrix there.
Barring the peer over your shoulder possibility if you use wireless in your home, a home access system is no more vulnerable than making employees drag their way into the city and back every day. And for every act of intimidation or violence that can be threatened at the home employee, a resourceful shadowrunner can think of just as many for blackmailing them when they go to work physically (loved ones, secrets, just good intimidation rolls generally).
If wired:
Ravor
Jul 12 2007, 01:24 PM
Yes, yes I remember your argument against offices existing, the problem is that you are forgetting something very important, the onsite and offline node is more secure for one very important reason, in order to hack it at all a Decker has to first deal with physical security.
So unless the corps are run by morons, in a world where the best encryption money can buy is a joke they aren't going to keep their sensitive data on a Matrix connected system for any Decker to hack into. What they would do is keep it on an offline system and only connect briefly whenever it's necessary to do so. (Yes, this means that a clever Decker can use social engineering to arrange for a hacking window, ect.) The everyday functions such as telephones, ect that need a Matrix connection all of the fragging time would be handled by a different network.
So yes, offices still exist because the only way to have any real Matrix security in Fourth Edition is to only use onsite networks and not be connected to the Matrix at large.
*Edit*
Afer all, it's not only secret research labs that are handling sensitive data whose release would hurt a corp, it's a pity that without decent encryption even your typical office has to use the same tactics as your hardcore SK Lab does to provide Matrix security.
knasser
Jul 12 2007, 05:39 PM
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Yes, yes I remember your argument against offices existing, the problem is that you are forgetting something very important, the onsite and offline node is more secure for one very important reason, in order to hack it at all a Decker has to first deal with physical security. |
Yes. And I remember that my post there asking for actual details on how someone would hack my remote office under the RAW remains unanswered. You will notice, that I very explicitly stated in the post you've just replied to, that the remote solution is as secure as an onsite one that has a connection to the outside. So please don't say that I am "forgetting something very important" when if you scroll up about three inches you will find me talking about that very thing.
Yes. You can make a system more secure by severing all connection to the outside world. Is this feasible? Normally, it isn't. The implications of going entirely offline are:
No phone calls in or out.
No sharing or passing data to another office.
No research on the Matrix.
No access to sales people in the team, your accountant, your lawyer, your clients.
No calling your partner to tell him to pick the kids up because you're working late.
Nothing.
Now I did use the word "normally" here. (I also covered this in the post you replied to before you raised it). Maybe Saeder-Krupp's research labs keep their valuable data on a system that isn't connected to the rest of the world. It can only be read by someone who plugs his head into the mainframe onsite. This is what I said! But most places cannot work this way. Data needs to be shared and that doesn't happen by the accounts manager plugging her head into one box. Copying some files across and then plugging her head into another box so that she can transmit some payroll data to the bank. And then getting bank responses into her head and going back again. Repeat and repeat and repeat all day. There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures. Any and all of this is potential paydata and none of it can be limited to a disconnected system.
You (Ravor) live in a world in which the only corporations are giant, monoliths that think nothing of adding 150% onto the cost of employee upkeep by dragging them in twenty miles each day and where the only data they ever work on is the top secret blue prints to the top secret optical chip that was developed entirely in one lab without the sharing of data with other labs or researchers. It might be an exciting world, but it's not a realistic one.
And finally, I once again hear you say thatweak encryption means it is "trivial" to break into the remote solution. Here is my specific question to you. No generalities, no unsupported statements that it's not secure because of "X" - tell me what you would roll to hack the site I gave above, where the employee at home has a wired connection to his home terminal. Because I was only illustrating a principle above and skimped on detail, consider there to be some IC on both nodes also. What you come up with will be no different to trying to hack a normal onsite solution that has a connection to the outside world.
-Khadim.
kzt
Jul 12 2007, 05:47 PM
I break into his house, very carefully detangle the wad of cables behind his desk, find the one that runs to the wall port and add a very small device that sits between his terminal and the port. This establishes a connection to a device I have elsewhere on the matrix. Then I can listen to all the traffic bidirectionally and add additional traffic as desired, which the user will never see but will look like it's coming from his device to the mainframe.
James McMurray
Jul 12 2007, 06:07 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
Yes. You can make a system more secure by severing all connection to the outside world. Is this feasible? Normally, it isn't. The implications of going entirely offline are: No phone calls in or out. No sharing or passing data to another office. No research on the Matrix. No access to sales people in the team, your accountant, your lawyer, your clients. No calling your partner to tell him to pick the kids up because you're working late. Nothing. |
This is not true: it's handled quite easily by modern secure rooms. You simply have all necessary connections going through an unconnected network. Everyone still does their work on their secured network with no outside connections, and they either roll their chair to another machine or flip their monitors to the other box on their desk when they need an outside connection.
With 2070 technologies you'd flip back and forth between two seperate connections to your AR goggles. VR bouncing back and forth would be harder, but when something has to be secured management rarely pays attention to wage slave amenities.
knasser
Jul 12 2007, 06:37 PM
QUOTE (kzt) |
I break into his house, very carefully detangle the wad of cables behind his desk, find the one that runs to the wall port and add a very small device that sits between his terminal and the port. This establishes a connection to a device I have elsewhere on the matrix. Then I can listen to all the traffic bidirectionally and add additional traffic as desired, which the user will never see but will look like it's coming from his device to the mainframe. |
I find it highly unlikely there are wads of cables in 2070. But I am asking what exactly you are rolling. I am playing the Matrix very specifically by the RAW and for every fluff approach X you come up with, I can come up with fluff counter Y.
However, I'm happy with your approach. I'm sick of people telling me that it is trivial to hack any remote access solution because "encryption is crap." What you've done is taken a different approach that doesn't contradict what I've been saying. You're now using a physical break in and the installation of specific hardware. I feel this raises the level above "trivial" and has already taken you beyond just hacking.
The rules for Intercepting Traffic are on pg.224. You roll Hacking + Sniffer to determine the difficulty of your tap being detected. Now this only applies to hackers who are in the node that the data is traversing. There is no such device as you describe in the RAW, but we could take a similar approach. In this case, I think there would be a likely countermeasure - it's the traditional Shadowrun approach. Probably we have opposed device ratings between the Tap-O-Matic and the Spy-B-Gone. However, having the IC I mentioned on Node A routinely scan for taps would probably uncover the tap sooner or later. Assuming that the rules for intercepting by a device and by sitting in an intermediary node are the same (and I think that's reasonable), then you would still be needing to actually hack the node in order to interact in a meaningful way. You'll note that my original post did talk about the "looking over the user's shoulder at the monitor" approach, although not having gone so far as to break into the employee's house, I only discussed it under the subject of wireless connections.
So you would still need to hack the node in order to go rummaging through the system looking for juicy files, etc. Passive interception might be fine for phone calls, but it doesn't cut the IC when it comes to stealing paydata. It is useful, don't misunderstand me, but it's a poor substitute for actually logging in yourself. The spoofing you refer to is only good for sending instructions to drones or agents (SR4, pg.224). It wont be any use for actually getting you into the system or extracting data.
So really, I don't feel that this has contradicted what I said. I did address interception in my initial post and for most work, you need to actually hack the node. And this returns us to it being no more or less difficult than an onsite system that has a Matrix connection.
knasser
Jul 12 2007, 06:38 PM
QUOTE (James McMurray) |
QUOTE (knasser @ Jul 12 2007, 12:39 PM) | Yes. You can make a system more secure by severing all connection to the outside world. Is this feasible? Normally, it isn't. The implications of going entirely offline are: No phone calls in or out. No sharing or passing data to another office. No research on the Matrix. No access to sales people in the team, your accountant, your lawyer, your clients. No calling your partner to tell him to pick the kids up because you're working late. Nothing. |
This is not true: it's handled quite easily by modern secure rooms. You simply have all necessary connections going through an unconnected network. Everyone still does their work on their secured network with no outside connections, and they either roll their chair to another machine or flip their monitors to the other box on their desk when they need an outside connection.
With 2070 technologies you'd flip back and forth between two seperate connections to your AR goggles. VR bouncing back and forth would be harder, but when something has to be secured management rarely pays attention to wage slave amenities.
|
James, please read the paragraph after the one you just quoted. You'll find my answer to your comment already waiting there for you.
Moon-Hawk
Jul 12 2007, 06:47 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures. Any and all of this is potential paydata and none of it can be limited to a disconnected system. |
Absolutely true. Which, IMO, is exactly why you don't use teams of shadowrunners to steal delivery schedules. That's the sort of thing your hacker gets as part of his legwork, because it is stored on an online system.
That's exactly why the top-secret MacGuffin that the runners have to steal is not one of those things, but rather something that doesn't need to be on an online system. The top-secret bleeding edge research can be done by people who haul their butts into work and sit in a room with two computers not connected to each other.
The people who process medical forms might have semi-secret data, but a good firewall is sufficient to protect it. It's not worth shadowrunning for.
Who cares if 99% of corporate information is stored inonline hosts, if that same 99% is boring and not worthy of shadowrunning for.
I'm trying to figure out what your point is here, but, I'm just not getting it. I must be having a slow day.
knasser
Jul 12 2007, 06:55 PM
QUOTE (Moon-Hawk @ Jul 12 2007, 06:47 PM) |
That's exactly why the top-secret MacGuffin that the runners have to steal is not one of those things, but rather something that doesn't need to be on an online system. The top-secret bleeding edge research can be done by people who haul their butts into work and sit in a room with two computers not connected to each other. The people who process medical forms might have semi-secret data, but a good firewall is sufficient to protect it. It's not worth shadowrunning for.
Who cares if 99% of corporate information is stored inonline hosts, if that same 99% is boring and not worthy of shadowrunning for.
I'm trying to figure out what your point is here, but, I'm just not getting it. I must be having a slow day. |
And I agree with you. My point is that you don't change the whole working practices of the world for the 1% of remaining data that actually is a top-secret MacGuffin. I explicitly and quite clearly said that keeping things off-line is an approach that big hitters at secret research labs would use. I said that in the very first post on this subject. And if you want to force your hacker onto a site as a GM then you may well decide that the top secret MacGufffin is what the hacker is paid to steal. But the rest of the world is enjoying the benefits of 2070 technology, thankyouverymuch.
I'm not arguing against the existence of disconnected systems. I'm arguing with the people who keep telling me the idea of a remote access system is absurd and unworkable and will keep getting hacked by the kid next door. The only two things that I have argued, are that it is not less secure than an onsite system where there is a connection to the Matrix, and that a connection to the Matrix is vital for most systems. This seems to outrage some people.
Moon-Hawk
Jul 12 2007, 07:04 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
I'm not arguing against the existence of disconnected systems. I'm arguing with the people who keep telling me the idea of a remote access system is absurd and unworkable and will keep getting hacked by the kid next door. The only two things that I have argued, are that it is not less secure than an onsite system where there is a connection to the Matrix, and that a connection to the Matrix is vital for most systems. This seems to outrage some people. |
Oooooooh, I see what you're saying now. I was completely missing your point, sorry.
I would agree that most stuff is not important enough to be behind a closed system. True, it might be hacked, and true, it would be bad, but not so bad that it's worth the trouble/money. I'll agree with you there.
So you're saying that the telecommuting system is not any less secure that the on-site system, provided said on-site has a matrix connection? Well, I don't know if it's 100% as secure, but I would agree that it's darn close. I mean, you could break into Joe Average Telecommuter's home and hit him with a brick (you'll forgive me if I don't include a detailed rundown of the rolls necessary
) while he's working and just start using his commlink and you've skipped having to log on.
As for the matrix being vital for most systems, I agree with that, too. But most systems are also boring and not worth shadowrunning for.
Ravor
Jul 12 2007, 11:37 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
Yes. And I remember that my post there asking for actual details on how someone would hack my remote office under the RAW remains unanswered. You will notice, that I very explicitly stated in the post you've just replied to, that the remote solution is as secure as an onsite one that has a connection to the outside. So please don't say that I am "forgetting something very important" when if you scroll up about three inches you will find me talking about that very thing. |
And theres the rub, with encryption being a joke, only a moron would keep sensitive data on a system that has a constant Matrix connection.
QUOTE (knasser) |
Yes. You can make a system more secure by severing all connection to the outside world. Is this feasible? Normally, it isn't. The implications of going entirely offline are: No phone calls in or out. No sharing or passing data to another office. No research on the Matrix. No access to sales people in the team, your accountant, your lawyer, your clients. No calling your partner to tell him to pick the kids up because you're working late. Nothing. |
QUOTE (knasser) |
Now I did use the word "normally" here. (I also covered this in the post you replied to before you raised it). Maybe Saeder-Krupp's research labs keep their valuable data on a system that isn't connected to the rest of the world. It can only be read by someone who plugs his head into the mainframe onsite. This is what I said! But most places cannot work this way. Data needs to be shared and that doesn't happen by the accounts manager plugging her head into one box. Copying some files across and then plugging her head into another box so that she can transmit some payroll data to the bank. And then getting bank responses into her head and going back again. Repeat and repeat and repeat all day. There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures. Any and all of this is potential paydata and none of it can be limited to a disconnected system. |
Yep, it's really too bad that all of the above are easily handled by two very simple fixes which I had already addressed;
( 1 ) Install a second system that has a consant Matrix connection to handle the things that needs one in order to work, like wageslave telephone calls ect...
( 2 ) When necessary connect your offline system briefly to the Matrix and then have an auto disconnect built into the system so some wageslave can't forget to turn it back off when he's done using it.
QUOTE (knasser) |
You (Ravor) live in a world in which the only corporations are giant, monoliths that think nothing of adding 150% onto the cost of employee upkeep by dragging them in twenty miles each day and where the only data they ever work on is the top secret blue prints to the top secret optical chip that was developed entirely in one lab without the sharing of data with other labs or researchers. It might be an exciting world, but it's not a realistic one. |
Close, but no cigar.
However in the Sixth World most corps worth running against aren't run by idiots who haven't a faintest clue how to protect their data from every Decker that happens to be surfing the web at any given moment. They are however run by a bunch of amoral bastards who don't have to worry about little things like labor laws and unions. Quite frankly they don't care whether or not
Joe Wageslave has to wake up at 04:30 in order to commute three hours one way, they aren't going to pay more and in most cases he can't afford to quit even
IF he legally can.
QUOTE (knasser) |
And finally, I once again hear you say thatweak encryption means it is "trivial" to break into the remote solution. Here is my specific question to you. No generalities, no unsupported statements that it's not secure because of "X" - tell me what you would roll to hack the site I gave above, where the employee at home has a wired connection to his home terminal. Because I was only illustrating a principle above and skimped on detail, consider there to be some IC on both nodes also. What you come up with will be no different to trying to hack a normal onsite solution that has a connection to the outside world. |
You're right, and that is why any corp that isn't run by morons will install an offline (most of the time) system as soon as they can afford it.
QUOTE (knasser) |
I'm arguing with the people who keep telling me the idea of a remote access system is absurd and unworkable and will keep getting hacked by the kid next door. The only two things that I have argued, are that it is not less secure than an onsite system where there is a connection to the Matrix, and that a connection to the Matrix is vital for most systems. This seems to outrage some people. |
And if those were the only two points you've argued I might be able to agree with you, the trouble is that you've argued a third which is that a system which is only connected to the Matrix as needed coupled with one that has a full time connection wouldn't allow an office to run.
Fortune
Jul 13 2007, 12:48 AM
QUOTE (Ravor) |
... you've argued a third which is that a system which is only connected to the Matrix as needed coupled with one that has a full time connection wouldn't allow an office to run. |
... efficiently.
knasser
Jul 13 2007, 01:04 AM
Lots of use of the word "moron" and (again) statements about how easy it is to hack any system that is connected to the Matrix, but still not answering the very simple question of what you would roll to hack the site.
I don't find your suggestion that the external Matrix connection gets turned on and off all day realistic to deal with
QUOTE |
There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures |
And I can add a few more just to round the list out: offices with multiple sites, those that share data with customers, those with customers who share data with them, companies that offer support, need support, need to process orders and check specifications with salespeople, engineers and managers out in the field, those that have a head office, those with sub-offices, sister companies, hosting virtual meetings with any of the staff.
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Quite frankly they don't care whether or not Joe Wageslave has to wake up at 04:30 in order to commute three hours one way, they aren't going to pay more and in most cases he can't afford to quit even IF he legally can. |
I, in real life, do not want my staff to turn up having been travelling since 04:30 in the morning and then getting back at 20:30 at night everyday. Even if I were a heartless monster, I'm not going to be an idiot and think that I'll get decent work out of them or that they'll survive the job more than a couple of months.
But I can already see where this is going. It's going to be another of those threads where you keep saying wageslave and putting slave in bold, whilst insisting that every thing that negatively impacts on employee welfare is countermanded by brainwashing employees and pumping them full of happy drugs. Which of course neglects the fact that if you could do that it would be more efficient to get the extra six hours of work out of them rather than travel, but that's another point.
I think we can all see that sealing off your office from the rest of the electronic world has massive negative effects. And I think most of us can see that for the vast majority of companies in the world, going to such drastic and costly lengths is counterproductive. The offline labs and NSA datastores, are going to be rare exceptions. You however, live in a world where every company is managed by clones of Hitler and researches top secret super-processors all day long. The rest of us however, play in a setting where an accountant can actually file a tax return.
The rules as written provide adequate security to guard most companies even though they have a Matrix connection. I can illustrate such a system if you wish.
kzt
Jul 13 2007, 05:51 AM
QUOTE (knasser) |
The rules as written provide adequate security to guard most companies even though they have a Matrix connection. I can illustrate such a system if you wish. |
Please do. I'd like to see how you can do this without the ability to use cryptography.
Ravor
Jul 13 2007, 06:46 AM
QUOTE (knasser) |
Lots of use of the word "moron" and (again) statements about how easy it is to hack any system that is connected to the Matrix, but still not answering the very simple question of what you would roll to hack the site.
|
You're kidding right? In the examples you've given a Decker would roll the exact same tests as she would in order to hack any node, the only real question is whether or not she'd have to take control of the wageslave's jackpoint first even if the "VPN" setup was using hardwired connections.
QUOTE (knasser) |
don't find your suggestion that the external Matrix connection gets turned on and off all day realistic to deal with
QUOTE | There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures |
And I can add a few more just to round the list out: offices with multiple sites, those that share data with customers, those with customers who share data with them, companies that offer support, need support, need to process orders and check specifications with salespeople, engineers and managers out in the field, those that have a head office, those with sub-offices, sister companies, hosting virtual meetings with any of the staff.
|
Do you remember the days before full-time broadband internet connections? I do, and simply connecting as needed is enough to handle most of your examples, with a second network designed to provide a full time connection picking up the slack where the first, more secure network can't.
QUOTE (knasser) |
I, in real life, do not want my staff to turn up having been travelling since 04:30 in the morning and then getting back at 20:30 at night everyday. Even if I were a heartless monster, I'm not going to be an idiot and think that I'll get decent work out of them or that they'll survive the job more than a couple of months.
But I can already see where this is going. It's going to be another of those threads where you keep saying wageslave and putting slave in bold, whilst insisting that every thing that negatively impacts on employee welfare is countermanded by brainwashing employees and pumping them full of happy drugs. Which of course neglects the fact that if you could do that it would be more efficient to get the extra six hours of work out of them rather than travel, but that's another point. |
*shrugs* Remember that this is the same world where corps think so highly of their employees that they are more then willing to implant bombs in their heads and threaten their families in order to ensure continued good behavior. And we can't forget the fact that it's a Canon fact that yes the corps do ship their employees off to be used as human test subjects, it's even stated as one of the punishments AA+ Corps dish out to their wageslaves caught breaking one of the corp's laws.
As for the extra six hours of work, sure, in fact I'm fairly sure that is one of the reasons that the larger corps tend to "encourage" as many of their wageslaves as possible to live in corp housing as opposed to living outside of their direct control.
QUOTE (knasser) |
I think we can all see that sealing off your office from the rest of the electronic world has massive negative effects. And I think most of us can see that for the vast majority of companies in the world, going to such drastic and costly lengths is counterproductive. The offline labs and NSA datastores, are going to be rare exceptions. You however, live in a world where every company is managed by clones of Hitler and researches top secret super-processors all day long. The rest of us however, play in a setting where an accountant can actually file a tax return. |
Hyperbole much? Try actually arguing against something that I've said as opposed to your own little vision of what you'd like me to have said.
QUOTE (knasser) |
The rules as written provide adequate security to guard most companies even though they have a Matrix connection. I can illustrate such a system if you wish. |
I'm with kzt on this one, yes please do illustrate such a system. Remember that you are competing against what real world encryption can provide.
knasser
Jul 13 2007, 07:37 AM
QUOTE |
You're kidding right? In the examples you've given a Decker would roll the exact same tests as she would in order to hack any node, the only real question is whether or not she'd have to take control of the wageslave's jackpoint first even if the "VPN" setup was using hardwired connections. |
Thank you. Initially, when I said that a remote system would offer the same level of security as an onsite system that had a wireless connection, you argued vehemently that I was wrong. If you agree that the debate is now between site with external connectivity and one with systems that are kept offline, then this is at least progress.
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Do you remember the days before full-time broadband internet connections? I do, and simply connecting as needed is enough to handle most of your examples, with a second network designed to provide a full time connection picking up the slack where the first, more secure network can't.
|
I just about remember before broadband, though less so in a work environment. I know that pretty much every business from accountants to universities to hospitals would choke if you, as a security consultant today, told them they had to give it up, let alone in 2070. There's a thing in the world of business called "competition." Your proposals introduce gross innefficiency and would only be considered by, for example, big league secret project types. So again we return to the way you seem to think the major industry of the Shadowrun world is death rays and perpetual motion machines.
QUOTE |
*shrugs* Remember that this is the same world where corps think so highly of their employees that they are more then willing to implant bombs in their heads and threaten their families in order to ensure continued good behavior. And we can't forget the fact that it's a Canon fact that yes the corps do ship their employees off to be used as human test subjects, it's even stated as one of the punishments AA+ Corps dish out to their wageslaves caught breaking one of the corp's laws.
|
I don't accept that this is the general, or even a significant part of the Shadowrun 2070 business world. It's not realistic or believable. Remember that my argument is about what is true for the majority of businesses. Not the odd branch of a megacorp. So when I say that your world appears to be run by clones of Adolf Hitler, that's not "hyperbole." It's a reasonable summation of things you've said.
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Hyperbole much? Try actually arguing against something that I've said as opposed to your own little vision of what you'd like me to have said. |
I believe that I just did.
QUOTE |
I'm with kzt on this one, yes please do illustrate such a system. Remember that you are competing against what real world encryption can provide. |
Will post one later for you. No problem.
-K.
Ravor
Jul 13 2007, 03:32 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
Thank you. Initially, when I said that a remote system would offer the same level of security as an onsite system that had a wireless connection, you argued vehemently that I was wrong. If you agree that the debate is now between site with external connectivity and one with systems that are kept offline, then this is at least progress. |
Um, if you really believe that then you need to go back and actually read what I've posted.
From this thread;
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Yes, yes I remember your argument against offices existing, the problem is that you are forgetting something very important, the onsite and offline node is more secure for one very important reason, in order to hack it at all a Decker has to first deal with physical security.
So unless the corps are run by morons, in a world where the best encryption money can buy is a joke they aren't going to keep their sensitive data on a Matrix connected system for any Decker to hack into. What they would do is keep it on an offline system and only connect briefly whenever it's necessary to do so. (Yes, this means that a clever Decker can use social engineering to arrange for a hacking window, ect.) The everyday functions such as telephones, ect that need a Matrix connection all of the fragging time would be handled by a different network.
So yes, offices still exist because the only way to have any real Matrix security in Fourth Edition is to only use onsite networks and not be connected to the Matrix at large.
*Edit*
Afer all, it's not only secret research labs that are handling sensitive data whose release would hurt a corp, it's a pity that without decent encryption even your typical office has to use the same tactics as your hardcore SK Lab does to provide Matrix security. |
(Boldfacing added)
QUOTE (Ravor) |
QUOTE (knasser) | Yes. And I remember that my post there asking for actual details on how someone would hack my remote office under the RAW remains unanswered. You will notice, that I very explicitly stated in the post you've just replied to, that the remote solution is as secure as an onsite one that has a connection to the outside. So please don't say that I am "forgetting something very important" when if you scroll up about three inches you will find me talking about that very thing. |
And theres the rub, with encryption being a joke, only a moron would keep sensitive data on a system that has a constant Matrix connection.
QUOTE (knasser) | Yes. You can make a system more secure by severing all connection to the outside world. Is this feasible? Normally, it isn't. The implications of going entirely offline are: No phone calls in or out. No sharing or passing data to another office. No research on the Matrix. No access to sales people in the team, your accountant, your lawyer, your clients. No calling your partner to tell him to pick the kids up because you're working late. Nothing. |
QUOTE (knasser) | Now I did use the word "normally" here. (I also covered this in the post you replied to before you raised it). Maybe Saeder-Krupp's research labs keep their valuable data on a system that isn't connected to the rest of the world. It can only be read by someone who plugs his head into the mainframe onsite. This is what I said! But most places cannot work this way. Data needs to be shared and that doesn't happen by the accounts manager plugging her head into one box. Copying some files across and then plugging her head into another box so that she can transmit some payroll data to the bank. And then getting bank responses into her head and going back again. Repeat and repeat and repeat all day. There are a myriad of such examples - letters to lawyers, clients, contracts, writs, bank orders, tax returns, invoices, job offers, salary details, references, medical forms, delivery schedules, purchase orders, incoming letters, calls, messages, security information, work schedules, marketing data, sales figures. Any and all of this is potential paydata and none of it can be limited to a disconnected system. |
Yep, it's really too bad that all of the above are easily handled by two very simple fixes which I had already addressed;
( 1 ) Install a second system that has a consant Matrix connection to handle the things that needs one in order to work, like wageslave telephone calls ect...
( 2 ) When necessary connect your offline system briefly to the Matrix and then have an auto disconnect built into the system so some wageslave can't forget to turn it back off when he's done using it.
QUOTE (knasser) | You (Ravor) live in a world in which the only corporations are giant, monoliths that think nothing of adding 150% onto the cost of employee upkeep by dragging them in twenty miles each day and where the only data they ever work on is the top secret blue prints to the top secret optical chip that was developed entirely in one lab without the sharing of data with other labs or researchers. It might be an exciting world, but it's not a realistic one. |
Close, but no cigar.
However in the Sixth World most corps worth running against aren't run by idiots who haven't a faintest clue how to protect their data from every Decker that happens to be surfing the web at any given moment. They are however run by a bunch of amoral bastards who don't have to worry about little things like labor laws and unions. Quite frankly they don't care whether or not Joe Wageslave has to wake up at 04:30 in order to commute three hours one way, they aren't going to pay more and in most cases he can't afford to quit even IF he legally can.
QUOTE (knasser) | And finally, I once again hear you say thatweak encryption means it is "trivial" to break into the remote solution. Here is my specific question to you. No generalities, no unsupported statements that it's not secure because of "X" - tell me what you would roll to hack the site I gave above, where the employee at home has a wired connection to his home terminal. Because I was only illustrating a principle above and skimped on detail, consider there to be some IC on both nodes also. What you come up with will be no different to trying to hack a normal onsite solution that has a connection to the outside world. |
You're right, and that is why any corp that isn't run by morons will install an offline (most of the time) system as soon as they can afford it.
QUOTE (knasser) | I'm arguing with the people who keep telling me the idea of a remote access system is absurd and unworkable and will keep getting hacked by the kid next door. The only two things that I have argued, are that it is not less secure than an onsite system where there is a connection to the Matrix, and that a connection to the Matrix is vital for most systems. This seems to outrage some people. |
And if those were the only two points you've argued I might be able to agree with you, the trouble is that you've argued a third which is that a system which is only connected to the Matrix as needed coupled with one that has a full time connection wouldn't allow an office to run.
|
(Boldfacing added)
I went back to see exactly what I might have said in your original office thread, and guess what, I only posted there once and never even mentioned the idea of *Edit* MATRIX */Edit* security.
Hell, I even dug up the "Luddite Ninja" thread to see if I said anything in there, and although I did jump into the discussion towards the end of the thread, it was about cyberware and stat uplinks, not offices.
So do you care to back up your statement?
QUOTE (knasser) |
I just about remember before broadband, though less so in a work environment. I know that pretty much every business from accountants to universities to hospitals would choke if you, as a security consultant today, told them they had to give it up, let alone in 2070. There's a thing in the world of business called "competition." Your proposals introduce gross innefficiency and would only be considered by, for example, big league secret project types. So again we return to the way you seem to think the major industry of the Shadowrun world is death rays and perpetual motion machines. |
Of course, my suggestion makes no sense whatsoever in today's world, because unlike the Sixth World we have decent encryption. Ask a security consultant want he would advise IF the best encryption in the world could be easily brute-forced cracked using a fairly cheap laptop.
It's not death rays and perpetual motion, it's looking at how people would have to adapt to a world without encryption.
QUOTE (knasser) |
I don't accept that this is the general, or even a significant part of the Shadowrun 2070 business world. It's not realistic or believable. Remember that my argument is about what is true for the majority of businesses. Not the odd branch of a megacorp. So when I say that your world appears to be run by clones of Adolf Hitler, that's not "hyperbole." It's a reasonable summation of things you've said. |
I take it that you haven't read "Corporate Download" have you? Remember that the AAAs alone control more resources then everyone else put together. As for the idea of it not being realistic or believable, take a look at how big business treated their labors in the era before Unions. Hell, look at how the powerful treat the weak in any society where the check and balances against abuse don't exist. It's not a pretty picture, but that is life in Shadowrrun, even for First World Nations.
QUOTE (knasser) |
I believe that I just did. |
Well considering that you also believe that I've "vehemently" argued against your tele-office idea because an onsite Matrix connected system was somehow magically more secure I don't put much stock in your ability to judge what I have and haven't said.
QUOTE (knasser) |
Will post one later for you. No problem. |
Kay, I'll be waiting.
knasser
Jul 14 2007, 11:05 AM
Remote Access Solution.
The purpose of this is to determine whether or not a site can have a reasonable expectation of security without using systems that are entirely separate from all other systems. Ravor has stated only a moron would believe this.
I have stressed even in the first post I made on this subject, that I am not talking about super secret research projects. I am talking about the average 2070 corporation. My point is that most of the world is fine operating this way.
What I will do is post a sample system of an office that does not make use of entirely disconnected systems and then I will show a sample hacker attempting to retrieve data from the site. Then I'll wait to see what anyone else does, whether they disagree with the rolls involved, the ratings of programs, or think they can see a better way of hacking the site, etc.
The network:Normal Corp, a subsiduary of Standard Practices Ltd. Node A (Distributed Network): System 3, Response 3, Firewall 4, Analyze 3, Encrypt 3).This is accessed via wired in terminals in the employee's homes. It can also be accessed from the main office site itself. It's function is to provide a means for home workers to VR commute.
IC #1. Pilot 3, Analyze 3, Track 3, Stealth 3
IC #2. Pilot 3, Analyze 3, Armour 3, Attack 3
Both IC programs run on the Node E listed later, but operate in this node. Their instruction are to verify the authenticity of anyone logging into Node A. If they consider the visitor to be an intruder, IC #1 will begin a Track action against the persona whilst IC #2 will attack if required to prevent the persona from getting anything it shouldn't or causing trouble. Otherwise it will wait until IC #1 has completed it's tracking. When IC #2 attacks, it will also put the node on alert against that hacker if this is not already the case. Both IC agents communicate of course and work in harmony.
Node B (Department 1 Network): System 3, Response 3, Firewall 3, Analyze 3.This is accessible wirelessly onsite, or else via Node A or C, which maintain active connections to it. The purpose of this node is to provide a work environment for the employees. Here they will do whatever it is they are paid to do.
Node C (Department 2 Network): System 3, Response 3, Firewall 3, Analyze 3.For all intents and purposes, this is the same as Node B, though used by a different group of employees.
Node D (Management System): System 4, Response 5, Firewall 4, Analyze 4.This is accessible only through Nodes B and C, both of which maintain an active connection to it.
IC #1. Pilot 4, Analyze 4, Armour 4, Attack 4
IC#2. Pilot 4, Encrypt 4, Armour 4, Attack 4
IC #1 will verify the authenticity of any visitors to the node and immediately attack them if they are not legitimate. It will also put the node on alert against the intruder if this is not already the case.
Node E (IC System): System 4, Response 5, Firewall 4, Analyze 4.This node is accessible only from the Management node ( D ). It exists purely to run the IC which normally makes its way from this node to Node A.
Paydata could be situated on any of Nodes B, C or D, but D is the most likely.
The HackerI take the following hacker (relevant attributes only).
Logic 4, Hacking 3, Cyber-combat 3, Stealth 4, Exploit 4, Spoof 4, Decrypt 4
Commlink: System 4, Response 4, Firewall 4
Note that he has what the book calls a “professional� level of competence in his field and is given better than average hacking programs.
The HackI'll skip locating the node as it's usually not difficult. The first stage is to attempt to probe the network. I'm assuming that the hacker is hot-simming as this gives him the best chance of success.
The hacker rolls Hacking + Exploit + Hot Sim (System + Firewall, 1 hour). That's nine dice with a target of seven hits. The hacker will probably succeed in around three hours. At the same time, the node gets to roll Analyze + Firewall, needing Stealth hits. That's seven dice against a target of four hits. The odds are against success, but it's about a 20% chance of being detected.
Throughout this example, I'll be going with the the laws of probability, so the hacker gains user level access to the node.
Now however, the hacker finds that there's some pretty serious IC protecting the system. Both IC#1 and IC#2 get a chance to detect the intruding hacker. That's Pilot + Analyse opposed by Hacking + Stealth + Hotsim. So six vs. nine in each case and ties resolving in the hacker's favour because net hits are required for information. Again the odds are in the hacker's favour, and there's only a 20% chance of being detected by an IC program.
However, that's three times we've given the hacker the benefit of the doubt. Probability doesn't work like this. There's been a 30% chance of being detected for the first test and 20% in the other two, meaning the chance of not being detected is 70%, 80% and 80% in the respective tests. That means the chances so far are 0.7 x 0.8 x 0.8 = .45. So our hacker now only has a 45% chance of not having been detected. And all he's done so far is enter the first node. The odds are that the hacker is now either being set upon by the IC or having his physical location traced (or both).
It's worth stopping here to assess the hacker being used. He's got what the book describes as a “professional� level of skill for his job, so this is what we would consider to be a “does it for a living� hacker. He's got better than average tools for the job. The Stealth, Exploit and Spoof programs alone are worth 12,000
which based on cost of living conversions, probably means he's got $7,000 worth of illegal, specialised software already and undoubtedly needs other programs, too. This is far from a casual hacker. This is the guy you'd hire. And he's probably caught at this point.
But is isn't definite failure. The odds are he's blown it, but we'll continue with the run because there's still a reasonable chance that he's in without detection. Now he can begin his journey to the paydata.
The next step would be to hack either Node B or Node C. I've set them to the same and the hacker probably wont know where he's going anyway, so it makes no difference here.
The hacker again rolls Hacking + Exploit against a threshold of System + Firewall. So that's nine dice against six target. It should take a couple of hours. There aren't any rules for re-setting the Analyse tests of the IC as the hacker is in their node for a couple of hours and a GM could make a big difference by allowing them to try again which would be allowable under RAW, but I'll skip that. It's something a GM can keep in mind if needed though. The node's chance of discovering the hacker is six dice vs. a threshold of four. That's only a 10% chance of discovery so again, I'm saying the hacker gets in. His cumulative chance of having been discovered after stealthing past everything so far now, is down to 40% though, and it's about to have a big drop.
From Node B / C, the hacker now takes on the real task of getting into the important systems – the management area. Firstly, our traditional Hacking + Exploit. Nine dice vs. eight threshold. It's going to take a few hours. (Our hacker's been at this for the best part of a day, now). Meanwhile, the node itself, is trying to spot the hacker and has its eight dice vs. threshold of four. There's a 25% chance of being spotted and our cumulative chance is now up to 70% likelihood of having been noticed. When the hacker gets into the node, he also has to hide from the defending IC #1 which is Pilot + Analyze vs. Hacking + Stealth + Hot Sim. Eight dice vs. nine dice. Heck of a risk! As ties go in the hacker's favour, he's got a 2/3rds chance of going undetected. And cumulatively speaking he's only got a 20% chance now of having got this far undetected. I'd be more or less happy to conclude at this point that with those odds the corp is the winner in this battle, but I'm going to finish this off.
The hacker now wants to get the paydata which is protected by some encryption IC. At this point, there are a couple of GM judgement calls. Does the IC know that it's being attacked? I don't think a GM should have any problem ruling that it does. So when the hacker begins trying to decrypt the paydata, it's going to respond and quite possibly trigger an alert, too.
The hacker rolls his Response + Decrypt + Hot Sim (Encryption x 2, 1 combat turn). So ten dice, vs. eight threshold. Average will be three turns. It's a simple action so it's not compatible with cyber combat. The Encryption IC will be attacking the hacker each combat phase and you can expect it to bring in its friend also. The hacker is not going to survive nine initiative passes of IC assault. So alternately, the hacker can attack the encryption IC directly, meaning he is at least putting up a fight. Again, that's going to mean the other IC piling in. If he's defeated the IC, he can then snag the file and probably decrypt at leisure, unless a GM were to rule it needs to be decrypted before it can be taken. The thing is, that even if he did defeat the IC (good luck!) the systems now on alert and there are so many things the system can do once it's detected him, that you can pretty much declare the run a failure.
So what we've done here, is set up a small, medium security system and pit a professional hacker with good equipment and skills against it. We've found that there's only a slim chance of him getting to the paydata undetected and that even if that were achieved, his chance of wrestling the paydata away from the encrypting IC is low.
I now await comments on whether anyone sees any other approaches the hacker can take to get the paydata.
Prime Mover
Jul 14 2007, 03:14 PM
Just read through this entire post and come to conclusion that were arguing about arguing??
RAW pg. 223 (boxed text) NETWORK SECURITY) Mentions means and methods for megacorp security. Cold storage,wifi inhibiting wallpaper and paint.
Along lines of what K is saying "Not all networks are configured as mesh networks."
The tiered network IS used creating layerd defenses. Includeing but sure not limited too traffic chokepoints,vanishing-teleporting-trap door-one way access. Also dual box idea also supported with the idea of private grids or isolated from matrix entirely.
Think both remote and traditional office settings are probably used in 2070 depending on need and security.
A note on encryption, yes encryption has become less effective in 2070 but still serves a purpose, slow down a hacker in your system buying system defenses some time. ( if using theory that file cant be downloaded until decrypted). Also RAW pg.225 some encryption schemes may incorporate IC as second line of defense......tracked while decrypting or attacked while celebrating!
Everyones game is there own, as GM its your job to bring "your" vision to life and keep your players coming back. "Have Fun!"
knasser
Jul 14 2007, 03:28 PM
QUOTE (Prime Mover @ Jul 14 2007, 03:14 PM) |
Just read through this entire post and come to conclusion that were arguing about arguing?? |
For my part, I'm not arguing that there are no offline systems or that this isn't a valid defence technique. I suggested it in my first post. My argument is that this is very inconvenient for normal businesses and online systems are the norm for most companies and corporations.
As I understand Ravor's argument, he has stated that only morons would use such a system and that such an approach is hopelessly flawed under the SR4 rules. I'm arguing the case because (a) I think this is wrong and (b) it might mislead GMs into not exploring an interesting part of the setting.
There was a previous thread that I started on the subject of office usage in 2070 and it got quite heated. I kept challenging people to actually tell me under the rules where the weak point in such a set up was and don't feel I ever got that. Eventually the thread died a death as people went away. This is a very similar subject area so around we seem to be going again. People tell me such a system is broken and I provide examples and ask them to break it. We keep repeating it and in the meantime, everyone else reads both sides, makes their own decision (rightly so) and wanders off, leaving two stubborn people both convinced they're right arguing with each other and getting nowhere in a little forgotten thread of their own.
At least that's how it seems to me. If there are people out there who agree with me, it would be nice to hear from them. :-/
Regarding specific items:
QUOTE (Prime Mover) |
( if using theory that file cant be downloaded until decrypted). |
I use this on a case by case basis. It has come up in my game, but there are also files where you grab them encryption and all, and deal with later.
QUOTE (Prime Mover) |
Think both remote and traditional office settings are probably used in 2070 depending on need and security. |
This is my point of view, also.
-K.
Ravor
Jul 14 2007, 04:37 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
As I understand Ravor's argument, he has stated that only morons would use such a system and that such an approach is hopelessly flawed under the SR4 rules. I'm arguing the case because (a) I think this is wrong and (b) it might mislead GMs into not exploring an interesting part of the setting. |
More or less, it's slightly more naunced then that but not by much.
In part I'm arguing that not having a constant Matrix connection on your main network isn't the death knell that you seem to think it is. It's like James McMurray has said, in order to switch between systems all the wageslave has to do is switch his subscription status, so we are talking about "wasting a couple of seconds per switch in order to buy alot more security. (Since in order to hack the system at all a Decker has to be on site and therefore has to deal with physical security as well.)
And if you allow your network to connect as necessary then it becomes a single Simple Action in order to issue a command to the node in order to connect to the Matrix. It's not as secure as the first option, but it nicely forces a Decker to use the hacking on the fly rules as opposed to the safer probing rules as well as being in a serious time crunch once she gets in.
As for your ecample, I'll don't have time to visit it at the moment, but will get to it this evening sometime.
tweak
Jul 14 2007, 05:22 PM
QUOTE (Ravor) |
[QUOTE=knasser]
In part I'm arguing that not having a constant Matrix connection on your main network isn't the death knell that you seem to think it is. It's like James McMurray has said, in order to switch between systems all the wageslave has to do is switch his subscription status, so we are talking about "wasting a couple of seconds per switch in order to buy alot more security. (Since in order to hack the system at all a Decker has to be on site and therefore has to deal with physical security as well.)
And if you allow your network to connect as necessary then it becomes a single Simple Action in order to issue a command to the node in order to connect to the Matrix. It's not as secure as the first option, but it nicely forces a Decker to use the hacking on the fly rules as opposed to the safer probing rules as well as being in a serious time crunch once she gets in.
As for your ecample, I'll don't have time to visit it at the moment, but will get to it this evening sometime. |
Are we assuming that all systems are the same from a systems stand point?
knasser
Jul 14 2007, 05:31 PM
Neither one of us is arguing about what is and isn't possible or correct under the rules, which is good. We're arguing over where the line between usable and efficient falls, realism in a word, so inevitably different GMs will draw that line in different places.
I look forward to your assault on my network.
I think any weaknesses are going to be on my implementation rather than principle, so if you do break it, then it will be useful to me in refining things for the next time. I'd like to comment on two things now though:
QUOTE (Ravor) |
In part I'm arguing that not having a constant Matrix connection on your main network isn't the death knell that you seem to think it is. It's like James McMurray has said, in order to switch between systems all the wageslave has to do is switch his subscription status, so we are talking about "wasting a couple of seconds per switch in order to buy alot more security.
|
Most of my examples are dependent not on whether the user can switch from one to the other (I accept that they can do this quickly), but on the need for data to go back and forth between the systems. All of the paydata examples I gave are things that would need to go between the office and the outside world. That's why my first criticism was about the accountant having to copy files into her head and then back again all day long.
QUOTE (Ravor) |
And if you allow your network to connect as necessary then it becomes a single Simple Action in order to issue a command to the node in order to connect to the Matrix. It's not as secure as the first option, but it nicely forces a Decker to use the hacking on the fly rules as opposed to the safer probing rules as well as being in a serious time crunch once she gets in.
|
This is a valid technique and I used this one in one of my Example Matrix Sites thread some time ago (it's in example #2). The difference is the degree to which I think it's feasible to use this approach for most work environments. In my example site, it was used specifically for a small accounts system, iirc.
I'm more optomistic than I was earlier. I'm hoping there are some people out there who are finding this thread useful in preparing Matrix systems in their own games.
-K.
Fortune
Jul 14 2007, 09:55 PM
QUOTE (knasser) |
If there are people out there who agree with me, it would be nice to hear from them. |
I'd say more, but you've pretty much got it covered.
kzt
Jul 15 2007, 04:09 AM
QUOTE (knasser) |
So what we've done here, is set up a small, medium security system and pit a professional hacker with good equipment and skills against it. We've found that there's only a slim chance of him getting to the paydata undetected and that even if that were achieved, his chance of wrestling the paydata away from the encrypting IC is low.
I now await comments on whether anyone sees any other approaches the hacker can take to get the paydata. |
My fairly boring medium sized network (no secret research projects, etc) gets attacked 50,000 times a DAY. What's the probability of success with 50,000 tries per day?
And thanks, but semi-intelligent hackers download the file and crack a copy of it at their leisure, off-line. Transfer actions always work for authorized users. So we'll give them a 99% chance to crack it.
So ultimately what you are saying that a decent sized corp will only have 10,000 people per day steal valuable data from them. I can see the CEO accepting that.
And you missed the entire issue with attacking using the legitimate logins of the remote users.
Jaid
Jul 15 2007, 04:23 AM
QUOTE (kzt) |
QUOTE (knasser) | So what we've done here, is set up a small, medium security system and pit a professional hacker with good equipment and skills against it. We've found that there's only a slim chance of him getting to the paydata undetected and that even if that were achieved, his chance of wrestling the paydata away from the encrypting IC is low.
I now await comments on whether anyone sees any other approaches the hacker can take to get the paydata. |
My fairly boring medium sized network (no secret research projects, etc) gets attacked 50,000 times a DAY. What's the probability of success with 50,000 tries per day? And thanks, but semi-intelligent hackers download the file and crack a copy of it at their leisure, off-line. Transfer actions always work for authorized users. So we'll give them a 99% chance to crack it. So ultimately what you are saying that a decent sized corp will only have 10,000 people per day steal valuable data from them. I can see the CEO accepting that. And you missed the entire issue with attacking using the legitimate logins of the remote users. |
to which he will respond, how many of those hackers are actually just script kiddies running pathetic agents on pathetic commlinks with pathetic hacking programs =P the pilot 1, exploit 1 agent run by a script kiddy has a much lower than 10% chance to break in... this is an above average hacker trying to break in to the network, let's not forget
for that matter, how many of those hacking attempts are actually separate? could be a lot of those are from someone's script.
odinson
Jul 15 2007, 04:52 AM
QUOTE (knasser) |
QUOTE (Ravor) | Quite frankly they don't care whether or not Joe Wageslave has to wake up at 04:30 in order to commute three hours one way, they aren't going to pay more and in most cases he can't afford to quit even IF he legally can. |
I, in real life, do not want my staff to turn up having been travelling since 04:30 in the morning and then getting back at 20:30 at night everyday. Even if I were a heartless monster, I'm not going to be an idiot and think that I'll get decent work out of them or that they'll survive the job more than a couple of months.
|
So i guess you've never worked at a place with 12 hour shifts? How about places like the oil fields in Alberta where you live in a camp and work 16 hour shifts.
Expecting your employees to wake up at 4:30 and be home at 20:30 is a very realistic expectation in todays world, so it is just as realistic in the future.
kzt
Jul 15 2007, 05:07 AM
QUOTE (Jaid) |
to which he will respond, how many of those hackers are actually just script kiddies running pathetic agents on pathetic commlinks with pathetic hacking programs =P the pilot 1, exploit 1 agent run by a script kiddy has a much lower than 10% chance to break in... this is an above average hacker trying to break in to the network, let's not forget
for that matter, how many of those hacking attempts are actually separate? could be a lot of those are from someone's script. |
Well, if you assume that each incompetent attacker has a .01% chance of success you have a full 0.67% chance of not having at least one succeed per day. Or at least 333 successes per year. If it's a mere 0.001% you have a 61% of not having a success that day. The Law of Large Numbers is a hard taskmaster. And there are a LOT of hosts on the Matrix.
It's really hard to tell how many of the attackers are connected. Many are script kiddies. Others are clearly pros. They are virtually all from compromised hosts scattered across the internet. The 60 host botnets that scan every machine in our IP space for a given vulnerability in 45 seconds are pretty common, but we routinely get hit by 20 hosts networks that spend 5 minutes doing a methodical portscan of the entire IP space, and by single systems that poke at known vulnerabilities or try to contact backdoors. We were hit by a totally day zero, out of the blue, vulnerability that rootkitted multiple windows DNS servers a few weeks ago, which we were saved from because our IPS prevented the return channel from being completed, and because our security guy is really good.
Jaid
Jul 15 2007, 05:59 AM
right... so in other words, that's not necessarily 50,000 attempts per day as SR would recognise it, but rather each group of (however many is "average") would be rolled as 1 attempt in SR.
that is, when a hacker is probing the target, they are not just making one "attempt", they are making, say, 100 attempts per second, and over the course of an hour, they start to narrow down an exploit they can use. perhaps over 2-3 hours, they finally actually locate a flaw in the security, and go to use it... all represented by 2-3 rolls, perhaps, but actually over those 2-3 rolls thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of 'attempts'.
just as an example. so if you look at it as a matter of hundreds of thousands of 'attempts' per time the hacker rolls, you're looking at a much more reasonable number of "attempts per day" as shadowrun would define them.
Ravor
Jul 15 2007, 06:21 AM
Ok, now that I've had time to go over your setup here is how that I see it as playing out.
(Odds were generated by http://www.unseelie.org/cgi-bin/dicepo.cgi )Ok,
Shade, our Decker has plenty of time and really needs some paydata to make her loanshark happy & pay for a new knee, so she is going to pull out all of the stops and do this right.
She probes
Node A using her
( Hacking + Exploit + Hot Sim 9 ) and is most likely to get 2-4 Hits per roll so let's assume that she manages to hack herself Admin Access ~5 hours later.
(She then jacks out and gets a bite as well as takes a nap so she is fresh for the actual datasteal itself.)<<<
[ Spoiler ]
Now we have a problem, we have a slight disagreement on the Agent rules, because I don't think it's viable to opperate an Agent on a Node that it isn't running on, in which case Node A is trying to run 10 programs and is running at ( Responce 0 ).
For the purposes of this example let's assume you are correct via RAW.
>>>
After she's done with her nap and a quick snack
Node A gets one test to detect her using
( Firewall + Analyze 7 )and is most likely to get 1-3 Hits, so she slips in undetected at Admin Access.
(Admin Access seems like a waste, but if we assume that Shade has done her homework it'll come in handy in just a little while. Besides, if you have the time you should always make your first hack at Admin Access just in case your cover gets blown.)Now since it's the IC's job to scan logins, they both get to roll their
( Rating + Analyze 6 ) and are most likely to get 1-3 Hits each. Since
Shade really doesn't want to be seen she rolls her
( Hacking + Stealth + Hot Sim 9 ) and once again is most likely to get 2-4 hits so she is more likely then not able to slip past them. These two rolls are the first real danger that she has been in on this run as it's possible although not too likely that one or the other IC will spot her and start a query.
(Remember that the IC only get to detremine one tidbit about her Icon per nethit, so they aren't going to instantly prounce on her, although a Trace program is in order. Also since she has Admin Access she should be able to come up with something to prevent a second scan assuming she passes the first.)Let's assume that
Shade has a basic knowledge of Matrix theory and practice, so she understands what
Node A was and tosses a virtual coin to decide whether to hack
Node B or
Node C next.
Now
Shade has a choice to make, what level of access does she really need in the next node? Although she has only been online for a few minutes does she want to grind away for several hours to hack herself Admin Access again or simply settle for User Access and only be at it for a couple hours tops? In the end she decides to strike the middle ground and hack herself Security Access, so assuming her average 2-4 Hits per roll she is likely busy for the next 3 hours or so before she is ready to access the next node.
Once she's ready
Node C gets to make it's
( Analyze + Firewall 6 ) and has slightly less then a 10% chance of detecting
Shade's backdoor. Since there are no IC in this node and it's unlikely that any of the wage
slaves are going to run Analyze on someone who looks like a Security Decker she is pretty free to start hacking into
Node D.
<<<
[ Spoiler ]
Second problem, by my account once the Encryption IC is activated Node D would be trying to run 9 programs so all of the node's programs should drop down to ( Rating 3 ).
>>>
Assuming that she once again opts for Security Access four hours later
Node D makes it's
( Analyze + Firewall 8 ) and is most likely to get 2-3 hits, so
Shade is more then likely safe, but like you've mentioned there is that 25% risk that the system will detect her, if that happens then perhaps she'll invest in some better programs next time. Still, with the odds in her favor she makes it into
Node D itself.
Only to come face to face with some IC. The IC rolls it's
( Rating + Analyze 8 ) vs her
( Hacking + Stealth + Hot Sim 9 ) and you're right, it's a hell of a risk, luckly for her she gets to throw Edge into the roll and in fact would be dumb not to.
Secondly in order to finish the run all she has to do is complete 2 IPs worth of actions even if the IC detects her;
(Complex Action) Data Search
(Simple Action) Data Transfer
(Simple Action) Log Off
As for the IC enbedded in the Encryption, well it may be a nasty surprise if
Shade isn't careful when she gets around to decrypting the data on her own time, but it doesn't play a part in the run at all.
So yeah, without decent encryption I still say that a corp isn't able to provide anywhere near the data security necessary to make "ease of usage" worth enough to risk a full time Matrix connection.
*Edit*Something to point out is that if this system was set up to only connect as necessary, even if it were actually connected for most of the day, the "flickering" connection would have forced
Shade to do all of her hacking "on the fly" and her chances of success drops drastically.
*Edit 2.0*Although of course a person would have to assume another function for
Node A since a remote office wouldn't work with a flickering connection.
*Edit 3.0*Ok I give up, why is this fragging board eating my post everytime I try to edit it? I'm just really glad I copied this slitch of a post onto my clipboard.
cx2
Jul 15 2007, 07:09 AM
Just my opinions here.
Not every run has to be a huge epic attempt to get something on a black project. In 2070 I could imagine a perhaps lower level team being hired by a C grade corp or even below to find dirt on a competitor or other useful information, perhaps even by somebody's ex. Financial and other account related records would be useful in this case. Equally purchase orders could be valuable as hints to what a corp or company are up to.
Thinking about it the whole breaking into someone's flat/apartment/house and getting access through their VPN could be quite a nice early run to shine the light on the matrix briefly, as much to get people used to the rules as anything.
Now I think people will probably take shots at me for saying this, but I think it is a perfectly reasonable thing for an average corp facility to do. Sometimes I think people forget that runs don't always need to be high level, and that there will be plenty of demand for what a corp would think is fairly mundane information with a low risk of being targetted in certain cases.
As to how many attempts RL networks receive a day, you really need to give a little leeway here since SR is a game and not rl. Real life needs to be applied to SR, but applied sparingly sometimes.
Ravor
Jul 15 2007, 07:15 AM
Well
cx2 I completely agree with your basic premise, which is smaller corps get hit too, and something as "mundane" as finanial records, ect is damaging enough to a corp that the relatively low cost of installing a second network and having your primary network only connect when necessary is well worth it in terms of the extra security that is provided.
*Edit*So basically I disagree with your conclusion because I agree with your premise.
Whipstitch
Jul 15 2007, 07:38 AM
You know, there IS one really good reason for having the network online most of the time. The best defense against a hacker is an IC busting security wiz of your own; even a fairly vanilla corp hacker can be quite dangerous if he's got the whole network at his beck and call, as well as enough juice on his commlink to bring his own agents to bear. Timed gateways are nice and all, but I would be willing to bet the corps would be quite likely to have a few semi-skilled hackers of their own babysitting and maintaing multiple systems remotely on any given day, and keeping your own people out of the system could potentially be more dangerous than exposing themselves daily to the underfunded script kiddies.
Fortune
Jul 15 2007, 09:14 AM
QUOTE (Ravor @ Jul 15 2007, 04:21 PM) |
Ok I give up, why is this fragging board eating my post everytime I try to edit it? I'm just really glad I copied this slitch of a post onto my clipboard. |
Multiple spoilers in a single post almost always cause problems when editing. It's a Dumpshock glitch.
knasser
Jul 15 2007, 11:00 AM
Okay. I'm going to take these things in order of my choosing. First Ravor, since he is the first person to ever actually answer my request to discuss the rules in actual specifics, when this subject has come up.
Most of what you've done looks fine, and valid points are that a hacker can probably log off, take naps, etc. and that Admin access can open up the potential for a PC hacker to think a little outside the box. But there are a couple of mistakes. The main one is that each time you Stealth past some IC or hack a node, you have taken it as a test in isolation. The problem with that is that just because you have a 70% chance of success at something, it doesn't mean that you're going to succeed four times in a row. In the examples given, by the time your hacker reaches the pay data, he will only have a 20% of not having been spotted. The odds are 4:1 in the corp's favour.
Regarding whether IC can run on one node and be present in another, by RAW it can. There is no distinction between IC and agents in the rules:
QUOTE (SR4 @ pg.228) |
...it specifically refers to a specialized type of agent program that is used to defend a system. For all game purposes, IC programs are the equivalent to agents and function the same. |
Just as your agent can run on your commlink and bounce from node to node, IC can be run on a specialised node and travel the system accordingly. It's actually a very sensible way of doing things.
QUOTE (Ravor) |
Second problem, by my account once the Encryption IC is activated Node D would be trying to run 9 programs so all of the node's programs should drop down to ( Rating 3 ). |
Actually, it's not System that drops when you exceed the required number of programs, but Response. And the node has a Response of 5 so that when the encryption IC activates, it drops to 4 which is still sufficient to keep System at 4 and not reduce the effective levels of the IC. It's actually why I gave the node Response 5.
Now we have a disparity in how we see the rules when it comes to the Encryption IC. The intention in having the paydata locked by IC#2 in Node D, is that you can't copy the file because it's locked by the IC. In order to get that file, you have to either use a decrypt attack or crash the IC and take the whole thing home with you to decrypt later. The BBB says that IC is sometimes used as a form of defence (under the rules for decrypting data) so that has to mean that you can't get data without defeating the IC. And you can't just copy the IC because it's a running program. If you were able to just copy IC then you'd be able to just copy any agent that attacked you. IC is explicitly a type of agent in the book, and you plainly can't just copy one when you're in combat with it.
In order to get that paydata, the hacker is going to have to find some way of surviving the IC storm that's waiting for him.
I don't want to get hung up solely on discussing the encryption IC, though. The accumulating chance of detection is a very significant problem as well. Remember that if the odds aren't stacked enough for the corp for your liking (and they're already quite stacked), it can always splash out and buy a couple more rating 3(average) IC programs and really skew them. The principle is solid.
For the sake of readability, I'll address other people's arguments in a separate post. We're heading merrily to one post per screen, here.
knasser
Jul 15 2007, 11:16 AM
QUOTE (odinson) |
QUOTE (knasser @ Jul 12 2007, 08:04 PM) | QUOTE (Ravor) | Quite frankly they don't care whether or not Joe Wageslave has to wake up at 04:30 in order to commute three hours one way, they aren't going to pay more and in most cases he can't afford to quit even IF he legally can. |
I, in real life, do not want my staff to turn up having been travelling since 04:30 in the morning and then getting back at 20:30 at night everyday. Even if I were a heartless monster, I'm not going to be an idiot and think that I'll get decent work out of them or that they'll survive the job more than a couple of months.
|
So i guess you've never worked at a place with 12 hour shifts? How about places like the oil fields in Alberta where you live in a camp and work 16 hour shifts.
|
Actually, I have done 12 hour days in manual labour jobs. It was absolutely exhausting. But office work is not manual labour and an office worker is not someone you can just use up and throw away. Fifty years ago, you had whole typing pools in offices. Now you can send the same letter to a thousand people, personalised each time and half the managers type their own letters anyway. You used to have dozens of clerks doing sums for accounting. Now you have a spreadsheet. Which does it better and faster anyway. My last employers even used speech to text to dictate letters directly onto the computer. It was useable and by 2070 it'll be perfect. My point, is that whatever your office workers will be doing for you in 2070, they wont be doing the sort of work that doesn't require them to be awake and functioning well, or that you can just use up and stick someone else in their place, easily.
I'm reviewing applicants for a post next week on behalf of a client. Hiring someone and training them is a significant investment. You want to look after them and get good work out of them.
Besides, the point of the hours wasn't that no-one would do it, but that the travelling was just wasted time. Even if you're haiving someone put in sixteen hours each day (not twelve, as you said), wouldn't you rather they spent that time working, than travelling?
knasser
Jul 15 2007, 11:20 AM
QUOTE (kzt) |
QUOTE (knasser) | So what we've done here, is set up a small, medium security system and pit a professional hacker with good equipment and skills against it. We've found that there's only a slim chance of him getting to the paydata undetected and that even if that were achieved, his chance of wrestling the paydata away from the encrypting IC is low.
I now await comments on whether anyone sees any other approaches the hacker can take to get the paydata. |
My fairly boring medium sized network (no secret research projects, etc) gets attacked 50,000 times a DAY. What's the probability of success with 50,000 tries per day? And thanks, but semi-intelligent hackers download the file and crack a copy of it at their leisure, off-line. Transfer actions always work for authorized users. So we'll give them a 99% chance to crack it. So ultimately what you are saying that a decent sized corp will only have 10,000 people per day steal valuable data from them. I can see the CEO accepting that. |
how many of those hackers are actually just script kiddies running pathetic agents on pathetic commlinks with pathetic hacking programs =P the pilot 1, exploit 1 agent run by a script kiddy has a much lower than 10% chance to break in... this is an above average hacker trying to break in to the network, let's not forget wink.gif
for that matter, how many of those hacking attempts are actually separate? could be a lot of those are from someone's script.
Crusher Bob
Jul 15 2007, 11:31 AM
Best add some descriptions of how user accounts are set up on the system. After all, some sub-set of the employees is actually allowed to access the paydata you want and subverting their login ID is probably simpler than hacking everything directly.
Node A;
Assume that all telecommuting guys have user access whatever their boss-level. This means that getting yourself admin access on Node A will just give you the list of authorized telecommuters, but not what other parts of the system they can access, so still no dice here.
Node B/C
Hacking admin or security level access here should be possible too, and it's where the real info starts to come in. By listing the users/etc I should be able to get a pretty good idea of the users who would be able to access the paydata I want (in node D). As doing much hacking around in node D is likely to fail, my next stop is some houses. Where I subvert the home telecoms and shoulder surf for a while (actually have my agents shoulder surf while I nap) to find out who is authorized to access the paydata I want, then steal their login info, and then just login to the network and get it. As my user account is already authorized to get the data I want, the network already gives it to me in decrypted form, so no need to mess with the encryption there.
Now the question becomes, can I get all this done before the internal checkups of the network notice my hacked admin account on node A and Node B/C? The best bet would be to remove both accounts once you have the user list. Subverting the home telecoms of (some number) of high level users might be tricky, depends on how secure their home telecoms are, and where they live. But they are almost certainly easier to subvert than Node D.
kzt
Jul 15 2007, 02:22 PM
QUOTE (Jaid) |
just as an example. so if you look at it as a matter of hundreds of thousands of 'attempts' per time the hacker rolls, you're looking at a much more reasonable number of "attempts per day" as shadowrun would define them. |
8 years ago we got maybe one hacking attempt per month that we noticed. Oddly enough the numbers have dramatically risen just as users of of the internet has dramatically risen, and the financial rewards of selling hacked systems to spammers, etc. There is no good reason to expect that this won't continue. And in SR it's vastly more likely that commercial competitors will hire hackers to break into people's systems, something that is extremely rare now. And the continuous background howl of the script kiddies beating on the system is useful cover for actually skilled attackers, which is also a good reason for the hacker community to make effective script kiddie tools available.
We've detected people who completely compromised systems, in the process of doing it. It's hard to react fast enough when it takes about 8 seconds to totally rootkit a system. It takes us a few hours to days to fix the box. We can trace them back, typically to Korea or China. When they are controlling compromised computers that belong to people who have no idea what is gong on, probably via other compromised computers. But that's an assumption, as you have to hack into the other system to find the connection list. Which is usually a lot harder than it was for the attacker, who promptly hardened the box. We don't hack attacker systems, as it's illegal and unlikely to yield anything useful anyhow.
knasser
Jul 15 2007, 02:48 PM
QUOTE (kzt) |
Oddly enough the numbers have dramatically risen just as users of of the internet has dramatically risen, and the financial rewards of selling hacked systems to spammers, etc. There is no good reason to expect that this won't continue. |
The Shadowrun setting doesn't support that. For one, the entire Matrix has been designed to prevent self-replicating viruses. The Matrix is not the Internet - a bunch of interconnected computers discussing whatever they choose however they like. The Matrix is far, far more than just a string of IP addresses pointing computers at each other. We have the rules for how hacking works in Shadowrun. We know how long and how successfully or not an agent can hack a site. And we know that they can be traced, too. In a world that was devastated by a computer virus, with perhaps hundreds of thousands dead, do you really think that the carefully designed structure of the Matrix supports sudden and massive replication and assault by agents? The rules don't support it. And in the Shadowrun setting, the people who you've just tried to hack can strike back at you in a way that is far beyond a victim's actions today.