QUOTE (hermit @ Dec 30 2008, 02:30 PM)
I'd expect roving bands of various size, much like CthulhuTech's Rapine Storm or Firefly's Reavers. However, they're likely to concentrate near population centers before overrunning them. They're effectively feral, except for the one-in-6 cases with more or less intact brains. In that case, fortification and sustaining lines would propably be the best one could do (and exterminating all carriers in one's own back yard), until someone develops FAB3.
Note that SR4 makes no specific claims whatsoever about how many Infected become savage.
We can conclude from the given material that numbers greatly vary according to the specific strain, with vampires being least affected and strain II having the most impact (and yes, i'd really like to see something more specific about that issue, as there's a huge difference between adjusting plausibilities and handwaving, one that SR4 is often not aware of).
FC specifically states that almost all sasabonsam retain their sapience.
This does not boil down to them not suffering from adverse effects of the infection, such as becoming more cruel and ruthless, but it makes clear that, besides the negative modifiers on mental attributes, a further decrease of intellectual capacities is exceedingly rare.
So we're dealing with large amounts of mostly functional Infected in this specific case.
Which means that we have to discard your "effectively feral" hypothesis.
QUOTE (Warlordtheft @ Dec 30 2008, 04:59 PM)
The third is the Iraqis themselves. The problem we face in that part of the world is that the countries are usually arbitrary borders drawn up by some scheming european colonialist back in the early 1900's or earlier. The Europeans didn't (or did to manipulate things) take into account other loyalties of those affected by these borders.
I wouldn't overrate the impact of ethnic tensions.
These tend to figure in mostly after a conflict has arisen.
Throughout the 90s, ethnic tensions and colonial map makers have been blamed as the cause of economies based upon upholding a constant state of civil war, but current analysis shows that these theories do not hold much water.
Evidence points mostly to economic reasons for intra-national warfare, with ethnic tensions following
after the conflict has broken out.
Of course, local leaders will call upon their own ethnic homebase first, which in turn often leads to ethnic polarization of an
ongoing conflict as a side effect, but we have many examples of structurally very comparable conflicts where ethnic separation based on postcolonial structures just doesn't figure in, such as Angola, various states in Middle America and so on.
In the case of Iraq, the main problem is not so much that we have Kurds, sunni Arabs and shia Arabs lumped together in one country, but that these three groups will inevitably quarrel over the distribution of natural ressources in their homeland.
The problem is that there's local rulers who will want exclusive acces to those precious oil fields.
That these rulers have different ethnic and religious backgrounds is a secondary factor that comes in
after the conflict has emerged.
The basis for this and comparable situations seems to be mostly a combination of failed or failing national institutions, leading to a nonexistant government monopoly of violence.
If this is combined with the presence of means of enrichment that function best under a constant state of low-intensity warfare, such as illegaly seizing natural ressources, setting up a kidnapping industry, producing illegal narcotics and so on, it already looks tempting to become a warlord and create (and more importantly : indefinitely sustain) a state of cicil war.
If said potential warlords also have an easy acces both to possible soldiers (read : if the population has a large number of undereducated young men whose best career choice seems to be to enlist in a private army) and ties to multinational corporations that will supply weapons in exchange for trafficking in their illegaly acquired goods, the outbreak of a civil war economy is highly likely.
In other words, if the potential benefits of starting a civil war outweigh the potential costs, someone will go ahead and try to to take advantage of this situation.