I don't remember any bearer bonds. All he has are "promissory notes for sums owed by various wholly-owned subsidiaries of Saeder-Krupp." Loans in other words.

He gave to Miles Lanier his Renraku shares "plus the board seat to which said shares entitle him" and to Arthur Vogel his seat on the board of Ares Macrotechnology. Considering he reached 24.1% after buying Aurelius stock (22% in 2054), Vogel had less than 2% to go with that seat. And Gavilan Ventures owned 12.2%, granting Nadja Daiar her own seat after Dunkezahn's death.

In most corporations, 'enough' stock to have a seat on the board is just one share. Then you need to be elected by the shareholders assembly, which is indeed easier when you're yourself a major shareholder: you vote for yourself and it's done. But you can also be sworn in by the vote of your best friend or grandfather who happens to own a quarter of the corp and wants to fill board seats with relatives (alone, he can only occupy one seat at a time, and thus have a single vote furing board metting).

Except for at least two attempted assassinations.

I just chalk it up to ignorance, because logically it makes zero sense (unless he was the majority shareholder) because otherwise, he'd be opposed by the other shareholders.

He is by my definition, but only because my definition supposed human beliefs. And I stand behind my thesis.

It depends on the corp. Each can have its own system of election. However AFAIK it's always true that shareholders can't "oppose" a candidate. If they don't want him, they have to elect somebody else. And this can be very hard in a corp like Aztechnology or Shiawase, where each of the shareholders' gonna suspect the innofensive 'neutral' candidate can be rolling for one of them behind the scene.

Although it seems uncommon in the US, some corps also use "cumulative votes" to elect several directors at the same time. It goes on like: if there are 8 directors to elect and you have 1,200 shares, you get 8x1,200=9,600 votes. You can use them to vote for as many election as you want. To keep it simple, let say a corp has 100 shares and 8 board members. A majority stockholder that owns 51 shares has 408 votes. If he tries to lock down the board, he could cast 51 votes on his favored candidates for each of the 8 seats to grant. A minor stockholder with 7 shares has 56 votes. Using them all on one candidate (himself for instance) for one seat, he can beat the majority stockholder. If there are 1 majority shareholder with 51% and 7 minor shareholder with 7% each, each of them could get a seat on the board and the big one who win 51 to 49 during general assembly would lose 7 to 1 on the board. That's it, if the majority stockholder is stupid enough. Otherwise he could use his 408 votes for only 7 seats, which give 58 votes each. But then the minor shareholders can try to unite... So the majority stockholder can play it safe, using 81 votes for 5 seats. The minor stockholder can win the three remaining with only a single vote, and still beat the major holders by uniting on the 5 other... Of course, in reality there hundreds or thousands of shareholders owning between 35 and 0.00..001% of the stock. The system is then supposed to stabilize at some point, with each shareholders of group of shareholders able to snatch a number of board seats proportionnal to their number of shares.