QUOTE (Flaser @ Feb 5 2017, 06:16 PM)

Um... I think you guys are mixing up things. I was talking about real-world encryption that the Internet and all your gadgets run on, not just the in-game mechanic of encrypted data.
I think that they're trying to close the loop between the two, and examine what the in-game consequences of various approaches would be.
QUOTE (Flaser)

@Koekepan: Not exactly. Part of public-key (AKA asymmetric) encryption is that you have so called "trap-door" (mathematical) functions. They're easy to compute in one direction but difficult in the other without special information. This duality is what allows you to more or less securely use the Internet. The computing power to crack these things is either widely available or it isn't... and your average hacker won't have access to the kind of hardware I'm talking about. (These problems are non trivial to crack with *super* computers).
Oh, I know. Long history with computer science, mathematics, and security administration here. If you're terribly, terribly bored I could even talk to you about different approaches to trap door functions and what might constitute a trap door function in the age of quantum computing, and how that relates to NP completeness, and .... but I digress.
Since you appear to have confused what I was getting at, let me try to be clearer:
You have three types of encryption, broadly speaking (and this is not on the algorithmic dimension, as you will see): encryption that can be cracked in a timely fashion, encryption that will take a while to crack, and encryption that is infeasible to crack before the heat death of the universe. You will observe that these categories are rather sloppy. This is not an accident. This is because cracking encryption is a contextually meaningful endeavour. If you're in a firefight, any cracking that takes more than two seconds is not very helpful. If you're preparing a court case, several weeks might still be plenty of time.
By this categorisation, encryption moves from infeasible to feasible based on the algorithms involved, the available hardware, and the context of need. Authentication systems that use encryption will add timeouts to their challenge/response systems as a defence against naive attackers. This is, you may observe, analogous to the difference between petrochemical resources and petrochemical reserves - something that peak oil denialists love to get wrong because it helps them paper over the cracks in their ideology. (In case you're unfamiliar with the difference, resources are stuff that we know exists. Reserves are what we can reach and extract at a justifiable price and efficiency level. We know perfectly well that we have massive, huge, vast resources. Reserves are a hell of a lot smaller, although the reserves number jumps every time the oil price does. This is why it doesn't matter how big the resources are - if oil costs $1,000,000/bbl but the supply is inexhaustible, nobody cares. It might as well be on Mars.)
I will gloss over various other attacks such as replay attacks, interference to force renegotiations and so on... in each case the question is: can you crack the encryption in time?
It is because of this contextuality of analysis that blanket statements about the viability of cracking encryption don't really help. So maybe it takes just twenty seconds for you to crack my ephemeral communication - so what? If it means that you discover that I intend to drop a grenade on your location ten seconds after it went off, who cares? Crack it all you want - the concentration will help you wait for the grenade.
Oh, and as for securely using the internet, I have very, very bad news for you: the encryption is surprisingly irrelevant because of the degree to which it is only one tiny aspect of the bigger security picture. I could give you a wall-to-wall OTP system, and I could still crack it - not the encryption as such, but the overall network. And this is (another reason) why concentrating on the encryption is misguided.
QUOTE (Flaser)

My problem with hackers as envisioned is that they don't make a lick of sense if you actually know anything about cryptography... Yes, yes... it's all just a game and having elves & trolls and magic-mojo doesn't make a lick of sense either. But cyberspace is a tricky issue because it's actually something we have ever more daily experience with, so the zeerust-tech and Holywood hacking are becoming ever more ridiculous as we as a society get more and more tech-savvy. Hence the idea that the brain (with ASIST) can fill in for a quantum-computer. These can solve said "trap-door" problems much faster because
they run many problems in parallel they allow complex (as in complex numbers) superposition of states.
Actually that's not quite true. If you want to handwave the magical power of something, the brain is a rather poor candidate. At best, neural systems approximate mathematical functions, and the degree to which that is meaningfully parallelised is very open to contextual analysis. If the brain is doing your calculations, you must have found precisely the right neurons in precisely the right configuration (that is vulnerable to things like whether or not you had any CNS stimulants in the last half-hour) and that has precisely nothing to do with the sensorium. If that were all you needed, your Ultimate Cyberdeck would be a portable petri-dish with a nodule of neurons from a rat.
QUOTE (Flaser)

Anyway, what hacker need IMHO is a single "Unobtainium" tech that defines what they can and can't do, why they can and can't do said stuff... and the wider implications of how this tech affects society as a whole thought through. Until we do that we're just putting band-aid after band-aid on the issue, since our demands* are mutually exclusive.
*:
1. A computer infrastructure that's usable for daily purposes.
2. Deckers hacking the Gibson with their brains jacked in and all (or most) things tech their plaything.
We hardly need unobtainium for that.
But first, let's talk about how encryption isn't the be-all and end-all of information security.
There are end runs around it. Let's say you devise the perfect encryption system. Uncrackable, forever. Trivially easy to implement, computationally negligible to apply, and even super-efficient in bandwidth. Well, every encryption system depends on the key. You have the key? You have the data.
How might I, your evil cracker from hell, crack it? After all, we do know, mathematically, how to build such things (or very nearly). Well, for starters I might see if any of the platforms that are end-point parties to your encryption are trivially crackable with these handy-dandy script-kiddy tools I have. They are? Oh, goody! Go ahead, my friend, encrypt all the things. Since I'm now a party to the encryption, I'm in. Even if the systems themselves are tough nuts, is your implementation really rock solid? After all, it's kind of sad how many have been cracked because they used non-random random sources (for example).
Maybe you're tighter than a prohibitionist's rear end on system security, and my script-kiddy tricks don't work. Ok, fine, fine. I show up in a nice suit, looking for a job. While the HR cutie trots off ("Oh, no hurry, I know you folks are busy, I'll just hang out here! This is great coffee, by the way.") to find out what the deal is, I'll peek under a few keyboards, mousepads and calendars to see whether just maybe someone left a sticky note with a password around. Oooh, will ya look at that! I'm in.
Maybe your buddies are all a crack team of total security badasses, who use three factor authentication every time they need to fart. Dammit, you're going to make me work for this? OK, great. I capture one of them, hack off a little toe with the claw end of a hammer and toss it in a blender. Then I ask him, nicely, to please log into the system for me. Awww, thanks, you're such a swell guy! You get to keep the rest of your toes! ... and I'm in.
Ok, so your people are immune to pain, fear or the need to ever see their loved ones again. I flush the corpse. What next? Think, think, think .... oh right! I hang out at their favourite bars, and pickpocket a suitable system. Yay, I'm in!
Wait, your people don't drink, your system times out authentication every two seconds, and if I ever fail a login they melt down to slag. Fine, next approach: Bribery. I identify the disgruntled, and do a few favours, maybe ask a few favours back. Your people willingly give your stuff up.
No, your team is all composed of total fanatics willing to tear their own hearts out before betraying you. Right, well, then we enter all-out social engineering. Get them to do seemingly trivial things that afford me some kind of entry. Maybe I get them to log in five times ("Geeze, it isn't working for me! Can you just try that again? Oh, I'm sorry to be such a bother, but I swear this thing is killing me ...") to infer things about the protocol, or the seat of the logic, or whatever.
But no, your team follows all procedures to the letter, no questions asked and no answers given. What else? Well, there's nothing like physical involvement. These days (like, today) many surveillance systems are networking based. Maybe if I can tap one of those lines (or *heeheehee* wireless!) and be the total man in the middle until I can figure out a gap in your storage system to which your surveillance goes, and then once I own that I have all the data.
You see the point? Encryption don't mean nuthin'. It's only one tiny, tiny part of a complex defence in depth. And if there is a consistent weak spot in the technology itself, it is the implementation.
(As an aside, in this age of Windows 10, App Stores, Google, AJAX frameworks and so on, it's cute how you can come up with phrases such as: "This duality is what allows you to more or less securely use the Internet." But again, I digress...)
So what opportunities do we have for justifying dhaeckers at all? After all, those heckers and dackers must have some good reason for direct neural interface, and the benefits of cognition as opposed to raw computation. Getting directly to the brain nominally tightens the OODA loop. The hdeacker must be able to act with quick enough responses to do things that would otherwise prove difficult or impossible. Encryption doesn't match this field of cracking endeavour, because a perfect defence to all dheackers everywhere would be to up the encryption game - and that's not the case. So what could it be?
If the OODA loop is the valuable part (and the fluff has always made a big deal of the screaming speed needs to be satisfied by neural interfaces) then there has to (by implication) be something requiring creativity and responsiveness for a valuable exploit. What might that be? Encryption? No. You're not decrypting anything faster because you're in a virtual battle with an army of rabid pacman ghosts. Running exploit scripts? No. Hit the ENTER key and let the scripts run. No OODA loop involvement beyond that. Social engineering? No. You're not socially engineering your way through a receptionist because you're arm-wrestling a centaur in virtual space.
The only thing that more or less makes sense in this context is probing and exploiting an unfamiliar terrain on the fly. This may include software and hardware elements, but this has much less correspondence with encryption cracking than, as I stated above, QA procedures. Find the hole, exploit the hole, see what you can get. Find the hole, exploit the hole, see what you can get. Some holes/exploits simply slow down opposition (sucking up RAM or CPU time) or create confusion (a billion bogus requests) while others actually penetrate things (SQL injection attacks, stack smashing and so on) which let you do the nefarious.
This is what I was talking about, and why I largely dismissed what you said about encryption; because it's not an appropriate match for the concepts behind the milieu, or what dheackers should be doing, according to the fluff.
Now, as a consequence of all this, you can see how earlier I was saying that it makes for a good career progression, because you can start with known exploits from a tortoise, and end up generating and recording your own new exploits and selling them to kids with tortoises. You can see how there's some degree of logic to the faster gear mattering, without instantly rendering your team's hdaecker useless because a bullet went through their deck. You can also see how it motivates certain real-world principles of information security, starting with: "If it's that darned important, don't put it on a computer." through "Well, damn. Put it on a computer, but stick that computer in a faraday cage." to "Nobody really cares, just put it in a spreadsheet next to HAWTCHICKSTRIP.mp4 and CUTEKITTEHS.pptx."
Basically much higher verisimilitude.